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Abstract
Background: In several health systems of advanced countries, reforms have changed primary care in the last two
decades. The literature has assessed the effects of a variety of interventions and individual factors on the behavior
of general practitioners (GPs). However, there has been a lack of investigation concerning the influence of the
resources embedded in the GPs’ personal advice networks (i.e., social capital) on GPs’ capacity to meet defined
objectives.
The present study has two goals: (a) to assess the GPs’ personal advice networks according to the social capital
framework and (b) to test the influence of such relationships on GPs’ capacity to accomplish organizational goals.
Methods: The data collection relied on administrative data provided by an Italian local health authority (LHA) and a
survey administered to the GPs of the selected LHA. The GPs’ personal advice networks were assessed through an
ad-hoc instrument and interpreted as egocentric networks. Multivariate regression analyses assessed two different
performance measures.
Results: Social capital may influence the GPs’ capacity to meet targets, though the influence differs according to
the objective considered. In particular, the higher the professional heterogeneity of a GP personal advice network,
the lower her/his capacity is to meet targets of prescriptive appropriateness.
Conclusions: Our findings might help to design more effective primary care reforms depending on the pursued
goals. However, further research is needed.
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Background
Demographic and epidemiologic trends as well as health
technology advances have been reshaping the configur-
ation of health service delivery to better cope with emer-
ging health needs. In the last two decades, reforms in
several European health systems have changed primary
care, for instance, modifying the organizational role of
general practitioners (GPs) and the content of their ac-
tivities [1, 2]. Primary care reforms have been aimed at
fostering evidence-based medical practices as a strategic
means to accomplish organizational and system goals.
The literature has investigated the impact of a variety
of interventions and individual factors on GP behavior
[3]. In particular, a traditional topic of investigation con-
cerns the comparison between single handed GPs (or
“solo” practices) and team practices, in terms of pre-
scribing behavior and other outcome variables [2, 4]. A
recent research topic regards the implications of rela-
tionships created through institutional collaboration ini-
tiatives on GP performances [1, 5]. The basic idea
behind this line of enquiry is that the relationships nur-
tured by GPs within collaborative arrangements forge
networks influencing GP professional behavior; in par-
ticular, such networks are expected to enhance the GPs’
capacity to contain pharmaceutical costs or to meet
other objectives.
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However, the GPs’ personal network of relationships
(e.g., entrusted colleagues available to be contacted for
advice) might also significantly influence GP decision-
making [6]. In fact, the rising pressures associated with
new accountability systems call for timely reactions to
uncertainty. In such circumstances, informal advice rela-
tionships can be valuable to cope with the growing
knowledge complexity of medical science and new
health needs that call for interpretive action and inter-
action [7].
Consequently, building on a social capital perspective,
our goal is twofold: (a) to assess the personal advice rela-
tionships developed by GPs with other health profes-
sionals in their Local Health Authority (LHA); and (b) to
test the influence of these relationships on GPs’ capacity
to meet two different organizational objectives estab-
lished by their LHA and concerning their prescribing be-
havior: containing pharmaceutical costs and meeting
prescriptive standards.
Theoretical model
Clinical knowledge is surrounded by a certain level of
uncertainty and ambiguity [7]. For instance, there is dis-
agreement among professionals about what constitutes
scientific evidence [8]. In addition, even shared scientific
evidence often lacks applicability to specific contexts of
everyday practice [9, 10]. Consequently, in situations
where the human capital (i.e., individual stock of compe-
tences and knowledge) is not sufficient to reduce the
aforementioned uncertainty, professionals evaluate and
interpret clinical knowledge by interacting with col-
leagues. In other words, they rely on social capital to
search for clues to reduce the risks – actual or perceived
– associated with uncertainty. In fact, the literature
concerning influences on GP prescribing behavior deals
extensively with social factors, though mainly in descrip-
tive terms.
Social capital can be defined as the actual and poten-
tial resources that pertain to a subject (actor or node)
through its network of relationships [11], although the
actor does not have exclusive ownership of such re-
sources [12]. In fact, social capital theory posits that a
node can access the resources embedded in its relation-
ships [13, 14].
In our study, we focus on relationships that GPs estab-
lish when they informally look for advice from other
health professionals. We argue that information and in-
fluence, embedded in these relationships, trigger GPs’
prescribing behavior and, consequently, impact their
capacity to meet goals related to this behavior. In par-
ticular, connections facilitate a focal actor’s (ego) access
to broader sources of information and improve informa-
tion’s quality, relevance, and timeliness [12, 15, 16].
Therefore, advise-seeking relationships might help a GP
to acquire pertinent, evidence-based, update information
in the first instance.
However, relationships (or tie) can have diverse qualifi-
cations thus differentiating the network they compose.
We based the notion of network heterogeneity on the
concept of boundary. A tie can span different types of
boundaries (e.g., physical, organizational, professional).
Echoing the distinction between “internal” and “external”
ties [17], we build on the idea that, respectively, intra-
and inter-professional links provide the focal actor with
distinct resources. In particular, boundary-spanning ties
(or bridging ties), linking actors who belong to different
professions, are important conduits of information and
capabilities [18, 19].
In this respect, Nair et al. [20] found that GPs were
likely to be influenced by the prescribing behavior of
specialist physicians (or “opinion leaders”) in their net-
work when an exogenous phenomenon occurs (e.g., a
new guideline or product), but the influence does not
work in the opposite direction. They called this
phenomenon the “asymmetric peer effect”, which identi-
fies the prominent influence of specialists on GPs’ pre-
scribing behavior. Therefore, heterogeneous advice
networks are conduits of influence that might weaken
the focal actor’s distinctive professional goals and norms
through the mechanisms of social contagion or promin-
ence [21]. This phenomenon does not assume disagree-
ment between GPs and specialists, but suggests that,
when GPs are uncertain on treatment and ask for advice,
specialists tend to conform GPs’ prescriptive behavior to
their own and, thus, away from guidelines that apply
only for GPs.
In conclusion, we argue that, everything else equal, the
composition and heterogeneity of a GP’s personal advice
network influence her/his capacity to meet organizational
objectives, because her/his personal advice network is a
proxy of the individual-level social capital that a GP can
activate to reduce the uncertainty surrounding her/his
decision-making.
Methods
Aim of the study
The main goal of our study consists of assessing the in-
fluence of a GP’s social capital on her/his capacity to ac-
complish two organizational objectives related to his/her
prescribing behavior: containing health expenditures and
fostering prescriptive standards.
Building on the notions of social contagion and
asymmetric peer effect, we expect that GPs seeking
advice from different health professionals are less
likely to meet organizational goals linked with their
gatekeeping function compared with GPs relying on
mono-professional links.
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HP1: The heterogeneity of a GP’s personal advice
network negatively influences her/his ability to contain
costs and meet prescriptive standards.
Following the general notion that better access to in-
formation improve an actor’s capacity to meet goals (be-
cause, for instance, reduces uncertainty), we expect that
GPs with larger advice networks are more likely to meet
organizational goals.
HP2: The size of a GP’s personal advice network
positively influences her/his ability to contain costs
and meet prescriptive standards.
Empirical setting of the study
In the Italian National Health System, local health au-
thorities (LHAs) are responsible for the health of the
population residing in their area and for managing GPs,
who are independent contractors and are paid mainly
with a capitation system. They act as gatekeepers to
drugs and higher levels of care, and citizens cannot con-
tact specialists without consulting a GP, unless they are
willing to pay out-of-pocket. Each patient can choose
among the GPs working in the city of residence.
Based on the idea that organizational and professional
development requires cooperation and the sharing of re-
sources in primary care, several LHAs have implemented
collaborative arrangements in which GPs exchange
knowledge and share practice space and other resources
[2]. In addition, LHAs have introduced information sys-
tems and incentive mechanisms to make GPs more ac-
countable for their prescribing and referral behaviors [1].
The study focuses on the LHA of Forlì, in the Emilia-
Romagna Region of Italy, which serves a total population
of 187,698. The LHA regularly collects data on GP
membership and prescribing behavior. We use data pro-
vided by the LHA from its administrative records, and
data collected in the field with an instrument adminis-
tered to the GPs.
Since 2012, 139 GPs were working for the LHA and
all were engaged in collaborative arrangements called
nuclei di cure primarie (primary care groups – PCGs). A
PCG identifies a group of GPs who are subject to per-
formance accountability systems focused on two types of
objectives: (a) cost containment of pharmaceuticals
(henceforth referred to as economic objective); and (b)
promotion of compliance with selected prescriptive stan-
dards (henceforth referred to as prescriptive appropriate-
ness objective). Each type of objective is associated with
two financial incentives, one concerning the accomplish-
ment of individual targets and one concerning targets at
the PCG-level. This paper focuses on the individual
targets.
Variables
Dependent variables
The first outcome variable concerns the economic ob-
jective, which consists of not exceeding the average an-
nual pharmaceutical expenditure per capita in the
Region. This objective was established by the LHA
through a contractual agreement with the GPs, which
basically recognized that no relevant epidemiologic rea-
son could justify a significant deviation above the re-
gional average expenditure. In our study, this variable
was expressed by the difference between the LHA’s
assigned target and the individual GP’s per capita
pharmaceutical expenditure (i.e., the higher the differ-
ence the better the performance).
The second dependent variable regards the objective
of prescriptive appropriateness, which consists of six tar-
gets, regarding different pharmaceutical categories: pro-
portion of prescribed generics for statins, drugs for
osteoporosis (ATC1 code M05), and angiotensin II-
receptors blockers (ARB) not below the regional average;
daily doses per 1000 inhabitants for selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) not above the regional aver-
age; proportion of an angiotensin-converting enzyme in-
hibitors (ACEI) over the sum of ACEI and ARB
prescribed above the regional average; and proportion of
BPCO2/Asthma daily doses prescribed not associated
above the regional average. Even this objective was
established via contractual agreement between the LHA
and the GPs, based on the consideration that the epide-
miologic characteristics of the LHA’s territory could be
assimilated to the regional average. The rationale for
increasing the proportion of prescribed generics consist
of fostering the use of drugs widely tested, not infre-
quently recommended as the first choice by international
organizations, and scoring high in the cost-effectiveness
ranking when compared with alterative drugs. The ra-
tionale of the other targets consists of fostering the
standardization of the GPs’ prescribing behavior across
populations epidemiologically similar. In our study, this
second objective was expressed as the sum of the ac-
complished targets, thus defining an ordinal variable with
values ranging from 0 to 6. Implicitly, we do not assume
any priority between targets because no target resulted
more important than another in the adopted incentive
scheme. However, meeting more targets result in higher
incentives for a GP.
Independent variables
The literature only recently started analyzing the influ-
ence of networks in healthcare, though it has investi-
gated the impact of a variety of interventions and
individual factors on GP behavior. Therefore, we
accounted for the main influential variables in this
respect.
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First of all, the logistic arrangements aimed to push
GPs toward team practices, and the team size is likely to
influence a GP’s behavior because team-based ap-
proaches to patient care foster interactions between pro-
fessionals [2, 22] and are important components of
quality improvement [23]. Therefore, our analysis took
into consideration the different extent to which GPs
share their practice space and the size of the teams de-
fined by the LHA.
In this respect, ten out of eleven PCGs have a refer-
ence location of practice where a patient can receive am-
bulatory services that are urgent but not serious enough
to justify access to emergency service. In a reference lo-
cation, one or more GPs have their practice and arrange
their office hours with the members of their PCG to en-
sure that patients enjoy extended daily access (usually
12 h, except for the weekend) to primary care with one
of the PCG members. Consequently, any GP can work
according to one of the following three modalities: (a)
exclusively in a solo practice; (b) in a solo practice but
also working part-time in the PCG reference location –
hereafter referred to as “partially shared” practice; (c)
only in the PCG reference location of practice – here-
after referred to as “fully shared” practice. Independent
from the working modality, any GP is member of a PCG
and accountable to the aforementioned performance
system. Except for the logistic arrangements, the
organizational arrangements implemented in the PCGs
are the same.
Size and demographic characteristics of the GP patient
list are further aspects deserving attention. In fact, previ-
ous studies showed that the number of patient assisted
is a relevant control factor when studying GPs’ prescrip-
tive behavior [24, 25], and it is well known that elderly
patients use a higher amount of health resources com-
pared with younger age groups [26].
Another influential factor is the population density be-
cause the level of urbanization was found to be associ-
ated with significant differences in GP prescribing
behaviors [27, 28].
Data and materials
We relied on archival sources of the LHA to collect data
on: (a) GPs’ capacity to meet the two aforementioned
objectives (i.e., dependent variables); (b) the individual
characteristics considered (e.g., gender, number of pa-
tients assisted, proportion of elderly patients assisted);
(c) the characteristics of each PCG (e.g., team size, popu-
lation density); (d) the logistic arrangement characteriz-
ing each GP practice, and the expected expenditure
adjustment index.3
We used an ad-hoc instrument to collect data on the
GPs’ direct advice relationships with other health profes-
sionals. The questionnaire asks respondents (ego) to
disclose their names, while – to protect confidentiality –
they were allowed to use initials or special codes to
name their different personal contacts (alters), who were
explicitly classified by profession (e.g., GP, nurse, psych-
ologist). Specifically, we asked GPs (considering the last
12-month period): “If you need to discuss what the best
treatment is for a patient, who do you call?” Respon-
dents could indicate up to six unique key contacts
(direct ties) forming their personal advice networks
(or ego-networks).
Paper-and-pencil questionnaires were administered
during LHA training initiatives targeting all its GPs in
the period March–April 2013. We collected 80 usable
questionnaires (58% response rate) and performed a test
for nonresponse bias to check whether our results were
affected by unknown factors that systematically distin-
guished respondents from non-respondents [29]. We
compared the proportions or the means between re-
spondents and non-respondents for seven variables: GP
gender, age, number of patients assisted, proportion of
elderly (i.e., aged over-75) patients assisted, expected ex-
penditure adjustment index, population density in the
PCG geographic areas, PCG team size, economic per-
formance, and prescriptive appropriateness performance.
We found no sign of nonresponse bias at the 95% confi-
dence level.
We considered three measures to assess the GP per-
sonal advice network: the number of ties (or degree cen-
trality), Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV), and the E-I
index. The measures assess, respectively, the compos-
ition, heterogeneity and homophily of a personal net-
work [30]. The formulas of the last two measures are
reported in (1) and (2), respectively.
IQV i ¼ ki 1002−
Xki
1
Pct2
 !
=1002 ðki−1Þ ð1Þ
Where i is the ego, ki is the number of professional
categories in the network of i and Pct is the percentage
of the k professional category in distribution of alters for
i. In our case, the IQV measures the professional alters’
diversity in each egocentric network, with 0 indicating
uniformity and 1 the maximum observed diversity.
E‐I indexi ¼ ðEi−IiÞ=ðEi þ IiÞ ð2Þ
Where i is the ego, Ei is the number of i’s ties with al-
ters belonging to professional categories other than GP
(i.e., bridging ties), and Ii is the number of i’s links with
alters who are GPs (i.e., bonding ties). The E-I index
measures the extent to which an ego’s ties form a bridge
across some social divide [31]. In our case, we consider
the divide originated from belonging to different health
professions. The measure ranges from −1 (in our case,
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when i all have ties with GPs) to 1 (when all ties to/from
i are bridging ties).
Analysis
We analyzed our data using two multivariate regression
models, coherently with each type of dependent variable:
a log-linear OLS regression model for the economic
performance (the logarithmic transformation aims to
better approximate normality in the distribution of the
dependent variable) and an ordinal logistic regression
model for the prescriptive appropriateness.
Analyses were performed using E-Net (version 0.41)
and Stata (version 12) software packages.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used in the analysis. The average GP is male
(while 46% of GPs are female), approximately 56 years
old, and assists approximately 1278 patients (14% of
whom are over 75).
The majority of the respondents (approximately 55%)
work in a team practice (either having a single, common
practice or working part-time in a PCG reference loca-
tion), while 45% of them work exclusively in a solo
practice.
There is a relevant variability of the population
density (from approximately 32 to 521 inhabitants per
squared kilometer) in the geographic areas served by
the eleven PCGs.
On average, GPs are not able to meet the economic
objective (mean difference = −10.91€ per-capita) when
their expenditure is not adjusted to take into account
the age and gender of the patients enrolled with each
GP, and they meet 1.73 (out of six) targets of prescriptive
appropriateness.
Table 2 synthetically describes the main characteris-
tics of the respondents’ personal advice networks. On
average, a GP consults 3.2 informal contacts when
she/he needs to discuss an important professional
issue or what the best cure is for a patient, and only
one contact is a GP.
The observed variability of the networks is relevant in
terms of composition (12.5% of the respondents reported
one tie, while approximately 64% reported up to three ties
and only 6.3% reported the maximum number of ties –
i.e., six – observed), professional heterogeneity (only
13.5% of the observed network is mono-professional and
approximately 68% displays the highest professional het-
erogeneity observed – i.e., IQV = 1), and professional
homophily (approximately 11.3% of respondents reported
links only with other GPs, approximately 6.3% did not re-
port a single link with another GP, and 7.5% reported an
equal number of GP and non-GP informal contacts).
Our main goal was to test the relationship between
the characteristics of a GP’s personal advice network and
her/his capacity to meet the two organizational goals
mentioned above.
As far as the economic objective is concerned, Table 3
shows the results of the first regression model. Control-
ling for the expected expenditure adjustment index, that
reflects the characteristics in terms of age and gender of
the assisted patients, the size of the assisted population
is negatively associated with the GP’s economic perform-
ance. In particular, a 10% increase in the number of
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean/Prop Std. Dev. Min Max
Economic performance 79 −10.91 37.31 −87.65 115.44
Prescriptive appropriateness 80 1.73 1.24 0 5
Age 77 55.66 6.04 33 67
Gender (M = 1) 80 0.64 - 0 1
N. patients (log-transformed) 80 6.95 1.06 0.69 7.44
Proportion elderly patients (75+) 80 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.24
Expected expenditure adjustment index 79 0.91 0.17 0.70 1.75
Population density (PCG level) 80 353.81 199.02 32.08 521.33
PCG teamsize 80 13.95 4.32 5 20
N. Ties 80 3.20 1.35 1 6
IQV (profession) 80 0.85 0.34 0.00 1.00
E-I index (profession) 80 0.26 0.52 −1.00 1.00
Solo practice 80 0.45 - 0 1
Partially shared practice 80 0.18 - 0 1
Fully shared practice 80 0.38 - 0 1
PCG Primary care group, IQV Index of Qualitative Variation (based on the variable “profession”), E-I External – Internal
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assisted patients is associated with a decrease in the per-
formance equal to 2.2€ per-capita (i.e., −23.003*ln(1.1)),
which is over 20% of the average performance (i.e.,
−10.91€ per-capita).
The characteristics of the GP personal advice network
did not seem to influence her/his capacity to meet the
economic objective, while there is evidence that the lo-
gistic arrangements do influence such capacity. Com-
pared with solo practice, team practice is associated with
significantly better economic performance. In particular,
GPs who partially or fully share their practice enjoy a
higher per-capita performance, respectively, 18.2€ or
10.9€.
As far as the prescriptive appropriateness objective is
regarded, Table 4 shows the results of the ordinal logistic
regression model. Interestingly, the population density of
the area served by the PCG is negatively associated with
the GP’s capacity to comply with prescriptive standards;
for a one-unit increase in population density, the odds
of accomplishing at least one target versus no target are
1% lower, given that the other variables in the model are
held constant.
The GP’s personal advice network influences her/his
performance in terms of meeting prescriptive standards.
However, the size of the network is not influential.
While a GP with a heterogeneous personal network is
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the GPs’ personal advice networks (ego-alter ties)
Variable (alter) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GP 80 1.06 0.43 0 2
Psychologist 80 0.75 0.44 0 1
Nurse 80 0.81 0.53 0 2
Cardiologist 80 0.13 0.33 0 1
Hospital Specialist (excluding Cardiologist) 80 0.45 0.57 0 2
non GP 80 2.14 1.25 0 5
any professional 80 3.20 1.35 1 6
GP General practitioner
Table 3 Explanatory model for the economic objective
Variable Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Age 0.237 0.579 −0.920 1.394
Gender (M = 1) - 6.792 6.829 −20.434 6.851
N. patients (log-transformed) - 23.003b 3.899 −30.791 −15.215
Exp. expenditure adj. Index 130.223b 19.438 91.391 169.054
Population density (PCG level) 0.001 0.037 −0.073 0.076
PCG teamsize 1.451 1.688 −1.922 4.824
Personal advice network
Size (number of ties) - 1.068 2.813 −6.688 4.552
Heterogeneity (IQV, profession) 5.466 13.386 −21.277 32.208
Homophily (E-I index, profession) 3.282 8.358 −19.980 13.416
Logistic arrangement
Solo practice – omitted - -
Partially shared practice 18.232b 8.790 0.673 35.791
Fully shared practice 10.886a 6.587 −2.273 24.045
N = 76
F(11) = 9.11
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
R-squared = 0.610
Adj. R-squared 0.543
a90% confidence level; b95% confidence level
Exp. expenditure adj. Index Expected expenditure adjustment index, PCG Primary care group, IQV Index of Qualitative Variation (based on the variable “profession”),
E-I External – Internal
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likely to accomplish fewer targets compared to a GP
with a homogeneous one. In particular, the odds of
accomplishing at least one target versus no target are
0.11 times those of a GP with the most heterogeneous
informal advice network (i.e., IQV = 1) compared to a
GP with the most homogeneous network (i.e., IQV = 0),
everything else being equal (CI95%). In terms of changes
in probability, the average GP with a given personal
advice network characterized by given degree of homo-
geneity (e.g., IQV = q, with 0 ≤ q < 1) is about 30 and 25
percentage points less likely to meet, respectively, none
or only one target compared to the average GP with a
more heterogeneous network (e.g., IQV = q + δ, with δ
close to zero); while the former type of GP is consist-
ently more likely to meet two or more targets (with mar-
ginal effects at the means ranging from about 2 to 25
percentage points) compared with the latter one.
Finally, there is mixed evidence about the influence of
logistic arrangements on GP prescriptive appropriate-
ness. On average, the odds of accomplishing at least one
target versus no target are 0.40 times those of a GP who
fully shares his/her practice compared to a solo practice
(CI90%), everything else being equal, while there is no
evidence of a significant difference in the odds associ-
ated with GPs who partially share their practice com-
pared to GPs working exclusively in solo practices.
In conclusion, the results partially support our first
hypothesis, while they do not support our second
hypothesis.
Discussion
The variability observed in the personal advice networks
is not related to individual GP factors or the logistic ar-
rangements implemented to foster team practice. In fact,
we tested the relationship between the network mea-
sures and the other independent variables in our two ex-
planatory models by means of multivariate regression;
the results show no sign of a statistically significant asso-
ciation between the independent variables and the net-
work measures included in the two models. Therefore, it
is likely that the characteristics of the personal networks
depend on the different strategies that each GP deliber-
ately adopts to work out appropriate decisions in uncer-
tain situations.
The analysis of two different targets highlighted that a
GP’s personal advice network plays different roles ac-
cording to the objective considered. In particular, when
an economic objective is considered, holding everything
else constant, the logistic arrangements fostered by a
team practice have a positive influence on a GP’s cap-
acity to contain expenditures, while the GP’s personal
advice network does not influence her/his economic per-
formance. On the contrary, when targets concerning
prescriptive appropriateness are considered, the GP’s
personal advice network is influential to her/his capacity
to meet them.
The information collected with the qualitative inter-
views conducted during the design of the instrument
along with our preliminary results support a possible
Table 4 Explanatory model for the prescriptive appropriateness objective
Variable Odds ratio Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Age 1.022 0.043 0.939 1.113
Gender (M = 1) 1.432 0.498 0.540 3.799
N. patients 1.000 0.001 0.999 1.001
Proportion elderly patients (75+) 0.041 5.174 0.000 1029.555
Population density (PCG level) 0.993b 0.003 0.988 0.999
PCG teamsize 1.256a 0.129 0.975 1.617
Personal advice network
Size (number of ties) 0.936 0.208 0.622 1.409
Heterogeneity (IQV, profession) 0.111b 0.967 0.017 0.737
Homophily (E-I index, profession) 1.638 - 0.575 0.531 5.057
Logistic arrangement
Solo practice – omitted - -
Partially shared practice 1.871 0.640 0.534 6.555
Fully shared practice 0.396a 0.498 0.149 1.049
N = 77
LR chi2(11) = 21.24
Prob > chi2 = 0.031
Log likelihood = −111.586
Pseudo R2 = 0.087
a90% confidence level; b95% confidence level
PCG Primary care group, IQV Index of Qualitative Variation (based on the variable “profession”), E-I External – Internal
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explanation. The performance concerning the first type
of objective is influenced by a variety of management
factors (such as the GP’s ability to persuade patients to
purchase the prescribed drugs from the closest hospital
pharmacy or being frequently updated about drug patent
developments) that are also likely to be influenced by
the GPs’ relationships with their peers rather than other
health professionals.
In this respect, the logistic arrangements may capture a
relevant part of the relationship among peers, as well as
the coordination efforts among the GPs (e.g., adopting
uniform communication strategies with patients, sharing
information about patients’ medical records) and between
the GPs and the LHA (that also manages the public local
hospitals). Inversely, the target regarding the second type
of objective might be most influenced by the GP’s social
interactions with specialists or “opinion leaders” because,
especially when changes occur in the therapeutic environ-
ment (e.g., pharmaceutical innovations or introduction of
new guidelines), GPs solicit the opinions of specialists
when making prescribing decisions [20].
As far as the direction of such a significant influence is
concerned, we already mentioned that the mechanisms of
social influence operating among GPs might differ from
those operating between GPs and other health professionals.
In particular, the interaction with specialists may emphasize
the benefits of innovation at the expense of the GP’s goals
associated with their gatekeeping function and norms (e.g.,
implement prescriptive standards); Nair and colleagues’ [20]
concept of “asymmetric peer effect” intuitively suggests the
dynamics associated with this type of social interaction. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, the information and advice
flowing from a heterogeneous personal network are likely to
conflict with the GP’s goals and negatively influence her/his
capacity to accomplish the prescriptive targets.
Practical implication
The results suggest interesting policy/management im-
plications. Because GPs need to interact with colleagues
to reduce uncertainty, fostering training and/or commu-
nication initiatives to share primary care goals among
other health professionals is paramount. In particular, it
is important to design strategies aimed at aligning the
objective of prescriptive appropriateness among the dif-
ferent health professionals. Like the pharmaceutical in-
dustry invested in targeting marketing activities at
opinion leaders among physicians [20], so health author-
ities could invest in initiatives aimed to raise the aware-
ness regarding appropriate prescribing behaviors (e.g.,
shared guidelines and care protocols) and eventually
incentivize multi-professional cooperation toward en-
hancing prescriptive appropriateness.
The positive influence of team practice approaches on
a GP’s capacity to contain pharmaceutical expenditures
suggests that logistic arrangements are effective at sup-
porting cost control strategies and facilitating the ac-
complishment of individual targets linked to this type of
organizational goal. However, team practice approaches
are not influential in the accomplishment of other types
of goals. In other words, there is not a one-size-fits-all
management solution in primary care reforms.
Finally, the negative influence of population density on
GPs’ prescriptive appropriateness may indicate that GPs
are better able to implement prescribing changes in
rural/countryside areas, compared with urban centers,
perhaps due to the higher authority they enjoy with their
patients. In fact, with highly mobile populations and a
plentiful supply of doctors, regulations for access and
use of services are more difficult to maintain in urban
centers compared with the countryside [32]. This is an
important aspect to consider when designing strategies
aimed at reducing the inappropriate use of drugs.
Conclusions
Two limitations of the study are the sample size and the
absence of information about chronic conditions. As far
as the former is concerned, despite the good response
rate and the absence of relevant discontinuities in the
primary care of the investigated LHA, caution should be
used when generalizing our results. In addition, we
could not collect data about the prevalence of chronic
conditions at GP level. However, because aging is associ-
ated with chronic illnesses, we consider the variables
concerning assisted patients aging (i.e., proportion of
elderly and expected expenditure adjustment index) to
be rough proxies of this factor in our models.
We found that GPs’ personal advice networks are signifi-
cantly different. The variability of the social capital inherent
to GPs’ personal advice networks influences her/his cap-
acity to accomplish specific types of organizational goals. In
particular, a GP’s propensity to ask for advice from different
professionals works as a detriment to her/his capacity to
comply with prescriptive standards, controlling for the GP’s
individual factors and the team-based approaches to pri-
mary care practice. However, the characteristics of a GP
personal advice network did not influence her/his capacity
to contain pharmaceutical expenditures. Our study is based
on cross-sectional data from one LHA of the Italian NHS.
Therefore, results should be generalized with caution,
though their policy and managerial implications might help
health authorities design more effective primary care re-
forms. Further research could use longitudinal data to test
the causality of the discussed relationships. However, an
eventual extension of our study must consider the LHA of
Forlì merged with another LHA in 2013 and is currently an
autonomous district of the new LHAs of Romagna. Alter-
natively, qualitative in depth analyses could better explain
the micro-dynamics behind our findings.
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Endnotes
1Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification Sys-
tem. The code “M05” identifies drugs for treatment of
bone diseases.
2Broncho-Pneumopathie Chronique Obstructive.
3This index is computed by the LHA taking into
account the age and gender of the patients enrolled with
each GP. When the index is higher/lower than 1, it means
that the average patient of a particular GP is more/less
expensive than the average patience of the population.
Abbreviations
GP: General Practitioner; IQV: Index of Qualitative Variation; LHA: Local Health
Authority; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; PCG: Primary Care Group
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the Medical Director and the Director of the Primary Care
Department of the former LHA of Forlì.
Funding
The research was funded by the State Secretariat for Education, Research
and Innovation (grant no. SER C10.0099; www.sbfi.admin.ch).
Availability of Data and Materials
Data will not be shared because of their confidentiality.
Authors’ contributions
SC conceived the study, coordinated the acquisition of data and performed
the statistical analysis. SC and LG carried out the literature review to
substantiate the introduction and the conceptual framework. SC, LG and FL
participated in the design of the study. LG and FL helped to develop the
data collection tool and draft the manuscript. All authors read and approved
the final manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Based on the declaration of Helsinki of 1964, Italian government issued the
DM (Health Minister Decree) 18/03/1998 regulating the establishment of
Ethical Committee for clinical trial. According to this national regulations, our
study does not require an ethical approval. Participants provided their
consent to participate by voluntarily filling the questionnaire.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Received: 1 August 2016 Accepted: 24 July 2017
References
1. Fattore G, Frosini F, Salvatore D, Tozzi V. Social network analysis in primary
care: The impact of interactions on prescribing behavior. Health Policy.
2009;92(2–3):141–8.
2. Visca M, Donatini A, Ginic R, Federico B, Damiani G, Francesconi P, Grilli L,
Rampichini C, Lapini G, Zocchetti C, et al. Group versus single handed
primary care: A performance evaluation of the care delivered to chronic
patients by Italian GPs. Health Policy. 2013;113(1–2):188–98.
3. Grimshaw JM, Shirran L, Thomas R, Mowat G, Fraser C, Bero L, Grilli R,
Harvey E, Oxman A, O'Brien MA. Changing provider behavior: an overview
of systematic reviews of interventions. Med Care. 2001;39(8):112–45.
4. Smolders M, Laurant M, Verhaak P, Prins M, van Marwijk H, Penninx B,
Wensing M, Grol R. Which physician and practice characteristics are
associated with adherence to evidence-based guidelines for depressive and
anxiety disorders? Med Care. 2010;48(3):240–8.
5. Fattore G, Salvatore D. Network organizations of general practitioners:
Antecedents of formation and consequences of participation. BMC Health
Serv Res. 2010;10(118):1–12.
6. Hackl F, Hummer M, Pruckner G: Old Boys’ Network in General Practitioner’s
Referral Behavior? Working Paper No 1310 2013: http://www.econ.jku.at.
Accessed 31 July 2017.
7. Malterud K. The Art and Science of Clinical Knowledge: Evidence Beyond
Measures and Numbers. Lancet. 2001;358(9279):397–400.
8. Ferlie E, Fitzgerald L, W M, H C. The Nonspread of Innovations: The
Mediating Role of Professionals. Acad Manag J. 2007;48(1):117–34.
9. Bohmer RMJ. Designing Care: Aligning the nature and management of
health care. Boston: Harvard Business Press; 2009.
10. Kanouse D, Kallich J, Kahan J. Dissemination of effectiveness and outcomes
research. Health Policy. 1995;34(3):167–92.
11. Nahapiet J, Ghoshal S. Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the
Organizational Advantage. Acad Manag Rev. 1998;23(2):242–66.
12. Burt RS. Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; 1992.
13. Bourdieu P, Wacquant LJD. An invitation to reflexive sociology. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press; 1992.
14. Lin N. Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 2001.
15. Burt RS. Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural
Equivalence. Am J Sociol. 1987;92(6):1287–335.
16. Coleman JS. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am J Sociol.
1988;94:S95–S120.
17. Adler PS, Kwon S-W. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Acad
Manag Rev. 2002;27(1):17–40.
18. Lawrence PR, Lorsch JW. Organization and environment: Managing
differentiation and integration. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University; 1967.
19. McEvily B, Zaheer A. Bridging ties: A source of firm heterogeneity in
competitive capabilities. Strateg Manag J. 1999;20(12):1133–56.
20. Nair HS, Manchanda P, Bhatia T. Asymmetric Social Interactions in
Physician Prescription Behavior: The Role of Opinion Leaders. J Mark
Res. 2010;47(5):883–95.
21. Salvatore D. Physician social capital: Its sources, configuration, and
usefulness. Health Care Manag Rev. 2006;31(3):213–22.
22. Watkins C, Harvey I, Carthy P, Moore L, Robinson E, Brawn R. Attitudes and
behaviour of general practitioners and their prescribing costs: A national
cross sectional survey. Quality and Safety in Health Care. 2003;12(1):29–34.
23. Meltzer D, Chunga J, Khalilia P, Marlowa E, Arora V, S G, B R. Exploring the
use of social network methods in designing healthcare quality
improvement teams. Soc Sci Med. 2010;71(6):1119–30.
24. De Bakker DH, Coffie DSV, Heerdink ER, Van Dijk L, Groenewegen PP.
Determinants of the range of drugs prescribed in general practice: a cross-
sectional analysis. BMC Health Serv Res. 2007;7(132):1–10.
25. Jensen UT, Andersen LB. Public Service Motivation, User Orientation, and
Prescription Behaviour: Doing Good for Society or for the Individual User?
Public Adm. 2015;93(3):753–68.
26. Anderson GF, Hussey PS. Population Ageing: A Comparison Among
Industrialized Countries. Health Aff. 2000;19(3):191–203.
27. Gabe J, Williams P. Rural tranquillity? Urban-rural differences in tranquilliser
prescribing. Soc Sci Med. 1986;22(10):1059–66.
28. Hsu CC, Chou CL, Chiang SC, Chen TJ, Chou LF, Chou YC: Urban-Rural
Disparity of Generics Prescription in Taiwan: The Example of
Dihydropyridine Derivatives. The Scientific World Journal 2014: http://dxdoi.
org/10.1155/2014/905213. Accessed 905211 Mar 902014.
29. Pedhazur EJ, Pedhazur L. Measurement. Design and analysis: An integrated
approach. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 1991.
30. Halgin DS, Borgatti SP. An introduction to personal network analysis and tie
churn statistics using E-NET. Connect. 2012;32(1):36–48.
31. Krackhardt D, Stern R. Informal networks and organizational crisis: An
experimental simulation. Soc Psychol Q. 1988;51(2):123–40.
32. Boerma WG, Groenewegen PP, Van der Zee J. General practice in urban and
rural Europe: the range of curative services. Soc Sci Med. 1998;47(4):445–53.
Calciolari et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:543 Page 9 of 9
